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Abstract: The traditional narrative of continued economic
growth driven by development aspirations towards mate-
rial-intensive lifestyles and associated ever larger extrac-
tion and use of resources is contrasted with an alterna-
tive perspective. This alternative may lead to much lower
growth, even to a “de-growth” of biogenic, energetic, and
mineral resources. Disruptive innovations, above all digi-
talization, combined with changing consumer preferences
and lifestyles as well as public policies to address climate
change could challenge traditional business models and
forms of service provision. Examples of such disruptive
innovations in the domains of digital convergence and the
sharingeconomyaregivenwith their potential implications
on resource use. Two contrasting scenarios, quantified
to 2050, illustrate the wide divergence of potential devel-
opments in resource extraction and use over the coming
decades.
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Technologischer und sozialer Wandel und seine
Auswirkungen auf Ressourcenverbrauch
Zusammenfassung: Das traditionelle Narrativ fortwähren-
den Wirtschaftswachstums, das durch wirtschaftliche und
soziale Entwicklung und damit einhergehende Material-
intensive Lebensstile – die zu immer größerem Mehrver-
brauch von Ressourcen führen – bewirkt wird, wird mit
einer alternativen Sichtweise kontrastiert. Diese alterna-
tive Sichtweise könnte auch zu einem viel geringerem
Wachstum des Rohstoffverbrauchs, ja sogar zu einem
Schrumpfen der Nachfrage nach Biomasse, Energie und
mineralischen Rohstoffen führen. Disruptive Innovationen,
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vor allem Digitalisierung, veränderte Wertvorstellungen
und Lebensstile und auch Klimapolitik könnten traditionel-
le Absatzmodelle und Formen der Dienstleistungsbereit-
stellung herausfordern. Beispiele disruptiver Innovationen
in den Gebieten der digitalen Konvergenz und der Ökono-
mie des Teilens und ihre potenziellen Auswirkungen auf
Ressourcenverbrauch werden aufgezeigt. Zwei kontrastie-
rende Szenarien, die bis 2050 quantifiziert werden, zeigen
die weite mögliche Divergenz zukünftiger Entwicklungen
in Abbau und Verwendung von Rohstoffen auf.
Schlüsselwörter: Vergangenheit und Zukunftsszenarien
des Rohstoffverbrauchs, Disruptive Innovationen,
Digitalisierung, Ökonomie des Teilens
1. Introduction
The history of materials use since the onset of the Indus-
trial Revolution is characterized by continued and spectac-
ular growth, albeit with changing underlying drivers and
rates of change [1]. Throughout much of the 19th Cen-
tury, growth in materials extraction, processing and use
was fuelled by industrialization and infrastructure build-up
of an ever growing number of industrializing nations in the
Global North. Growth in the 20th Century was driven by
an emerging mass-consumption society, suburbanization
and pervasive diffusion of private transport vehicles (auto-
mobiles) and associated infrastructures in theGlobal North
as well as industrialization and economic “catch-up” in the
Global South. In themature economies of the Global North
materials use is largely saturated, i.e. materials use decou-
ples increasingly fromeconomic growth: These economies
“dematerialize” [2], even if only in relative terms, leading
to a stabilization of materials use at a high level and with
materials production partly relocating to the Global South.
In the emerging economies of theGlobal South, population
and economic growth as well as industrialization continue
to be fundamental drivers of expanding materials use and
production, compoundedby theeffectsof globalizationand
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Fig. 1: GlobalMaterialsextractionanduse1900–2015, inGt(Billiontons).
Datasource: [3]
relocation of resource extraction and processing from the
Global North to the Global South, particularly in Asia.
The combined impacts of above diverse development
trends resulted in a spectacular expansion of materials
use and production throughout the 20th Century ([3] and
Fig. 1). Aggregated over biomass (food, feed, and ma-
terials), (fossil) energy, ores (metals) and non-metallic
minerals (primarily construction materials), global mate-
rial use increased from some 7Gt in 1900 to 90Gt by 2015,
i.e. more than 10-fold; or from less than 5 tons per capita in
1900 to over 12 tons per capita by 2015 [3]. Evidently these
global averages mask enormous disparities in levels of
material use between rich and the poor, between countries
(North-South), but also between different segments of the
population (within countries of the Global South), dispar-
ities that are often interpreted as fundamental drivers of
future growth in materials use.
Byand large, thehistorical developmentsprovideapow-
erful support of theup tonowdominant narrativeof thema-
terials sector: Growth is fuelled by the combination of pop-
ulation and economic growth and the globalization of ma-
terials-intensive lifestyles and associated artefacts and in-
frastructures (high caloriemeat-intensive diets, single fam-
ily homes, automobiles, consumer goods, roads, shopping
malls, etc.) that is likely to continue with the development
aspirations in the Global South and a perceived globaliza-
tion of “Western” lifestyles, all of which provide for contin-
ued growth of materials use (and extraction) for decades
to come: “business as usual” or rather “development as
usual”.
An alternative development narrative is, however,
slowly emerging. Some point to the high inefficiencies and
vast environmental impacts associated with “development
as usual” and to the vast potentials for improved efficiency
in resource use [4] without compromising amenities and
services provided. Others [5] highlight the imperatives
of sustainable development and the respect for (envi-
ronmental) “planetary boundaries” [6] that have recently
been enshrined in the 17 Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) of the United Nations, embraced by all nations on
the planet. A new literature on “disruptive innovations” [7]
accumulates increasing evidence on new emerging trends
of social and technological change that could disrupt the
traditional “development as usual” paradigm. Examples of
such disruptive innovations are illustrated in the following
sections.
2. New Trends in Social and Technological
Change
Social and technological changes—intertwined and co-de-
pendent—have always fundamentally shaped human de-
velopment. Many of them are incremental and gradual
and happen all the time. A few however, represent rad-
ical changes that occur infrequently—but clustered—and
change dominant development paradigms into new direc-
tions. Joseph A. Schumpeter [8] referred to them as “radi-
cal” innovations. More recently Clayton M. Christensen [9]
speaks of “disruptive” innovations, defined as those that
holdpotential to change traditional businessmodels, forms
of market organization, models of service provision, prod-
ucts, etc.
The advent of pervasive digitalization as enabling “gen-
eral purpose technology” provides a perfect example of
suchdisruptive innovations. The largest transformative im-
pacts of digitalization on materials consumption and pro-
duction arise from two trends [10]:
(Near) zero marginal costs of digital transactions, i.e.
an additional unit of consumption (e.g. a video or music
streaming/download) can be provided at practically zero
costs, which can vastly reduce costs and hence increases
affordability for poorer segments of society. Hence, the in-
terest of substituting current dominant, resource intensive,
physical products and services by digital, “virtual” services
as main element of a “dematerialization” strategy.
The possibility of matching supply and demand in real-
time through digital coordination platforms offer vast po-
tentials for better asset utilization and improved quality of
service. This is inessence theunderlyingprincipleof theso-
called “sharing economy” inwhich the traditionalmodel of
serviceprovision is shifted from“ownership” to “usership”
of devices providing consumer services. “Just in time” ser-
vice provision models can also make traditional differenti-
ations for instance as between public (large volume, low
costs, schedule based, fixed access and delivery stations)
and private (low volume, high cost, flexible timing and de-
livery points) transport increasingly blurred if not obsolete.
Fig. 2 provides (a non-exhaustive) list of recently pro-
posed or introduced digitally enabled new service provi-
sion models [11]. The multitude of different innovations
can be summarized conveniently under three generic prin-
ciples:
a. the move from service provision models that rely on
ownership (of end-use devices like cars, TV sets, etc.)
to “usership” (i.e. use of rented devices or use of digital
rather than analog, physical services);
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Fig. 2: Examplesofdisruptive
end-use innovationsenables
bydigitalization. Source: [11]
b. the reorganization of traditional segmented “top-down”
(producer to consumer) market transactions to a “shar-
ing economy” of “pro-sumers” (consumers becoming
also producers of services instead of remaining passive
consumers);
c. the move from “atomized” services towards integrated
and connected systems (digital convergence, Internet of
Things, etc.).
Observed technological and social changes underpin and
support above transformations. For instance the rapid dif-
fusion of mobile phones to currently over 8 billion devices
worldwide (more than theglobal population), have resulted
in almost equal access to this communication technology.
Mobile phones are now the technology that is most equi-
tably distributed across all consumers on the planet, even
moreequitably thanTVsor radios [12]. Abouthalf ofmobile
phones already are smartphones, which are also becoming
increasingly adopted by older generations as well beyond
their almost universal adoption among the young.
The traditional appeal of owning end-use devices is also
eroding. Perhaps the most significant trend is the declin-
ing percentage of people that hold driver’s licenses that
is declining across all age cohorts across all major OECD
countries [13] with declines more pronounced among the
age group below 25 years. The most extreme example is
provided by the city of Stockholm Sweden, where only 10%
of the population below 21 now hold a driver’s license [14].
3. Examples of Disruptive Innovations and
Their Impacts on Resource Use
Fig. 3 illustrates the principles of digital service provision
and of device convergence and its resulting materials and
resource impacts. The traditionalmodeof amultitudeof at-
omized services being provided by consumer-owned sep-
arate, analog end-use devices is replaced by an integrated
digital service platform (the smartphone) that delivers all
digital services (communication, entertainment, financial
transactions, shopping, etc.) via a single device.
Assuming 100% replacement, this results in a reduc-
tion of materials use (weight) by a factor of 260 (from 26
to 0.1kg) corresponding reductions in embodied energy of
a factor of 23, operational energy of a factor of 26 and peak
power use (critical for load management) by a factor of 90
(from some 450 to 5W) [15]. The impacts of digital ser-
vices and device convergence are thus indeed disruptive
for a range of industries including consumer electronics,
media production, as well as manufacturing and materials
processing and extractive industries.
Another example of disruptive change is provided by
novel integrated shared mobility models for providing ur-
ban transportation needs. Through a series of detailed
simulations the OECD International Transport Forum (ITF)
has examined several cities for their potential to dislodge
the traditional market segmentation between private and
public transport via an integrated shared mobility platform
[14]. There private vehicles andmost of public buses are re-
placed by a fleet of shared taxis (6-seaters), mini-buses (8-
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seaters) and midi-buses (with 16 seats) that provide feeder
services to the “backbone” high capacity public transport
systems like metro, tram, or rail services, that remain
largely unchanged (only with capacity expansion). This
fleet of sharedmobility vehicles is coordinated by a “just in
time” mobility scheme coordinated via a central dispatch-
ing system which passengers use via a smartphone app
with pickups in real-time from their home (shared taxis)
or from shared-mobility nodes located at a maximum dis-
tance of 400 meters from any home (taxi-buses require
30min advance booking via the shared mobility app). De-
tailed, spatially-explicit simulations with an Agent-based
Model (ABM) map in real-time the mobility patterns (ori-
gin-destination trips) of the entire population of a city over
a daywith amatching sharedmobility urban transport fleet
and calculate vehicle stock requirements, transport speeds,
costs, congestion and energy use and emissions. (Fig. 4).
The integrated shared mobility system provides step-
change improvements on all indicators of urban transport
performance. Compared to the status quo, the entire mo-
bility of a city at any desired time and destination can be
provided with only 2–5% of the original vehicle fleet, re-
ducing congestion by 30–50%, and reducing costs and CO2
emissions by half. For materials, the drastically reduced
vehicle fleet translates into significant reductions in mate-
rial requirements for the manufacturing of vehicles, mod-
erated only by their much higher utilization rate and higher
transport distances and hence shorter lifetime. In turn the
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Fig. 4: Urbansharedmobility
casestudiesand their impacts.
Source: basedon [14]
resulting faster turnover rate of the shared mobility fleet
allows for rapid innovation and introduction of alternative
propulsion systems (electric, or fuel cells) within less than
10 years [15].
Illustrative quantifications suggest a minimum reduc-
tion potential e.g. for steel use for vehicles of at least
100Mio. tons/year by 2050 [15].
4. Scenarios of Materials Use to 2050
Fig. 5 illustrates the potential convergence in global ma-
terials use contrasting history with two scenarios to 2050.
The Global Convergence scenario [3] basically describes
Fig. 5: Globalmaterials ex-
tractionanduse1900–2015and
for twoscenarios to2050, inGt
(Billion tons). Source: based
on [3]and [15]
a “development as usual” pathway in which global mate-
rials use more than doubles by 2050 (215Gt) compared to
the present (2020: ~100Gt). Growth inmaterials use in such
a scenario characterizes all categories from biomass (food,
feed, fiber) +40%, fossil fuels +70%, and minerals (metals)
and non-metallic minerals (construction materials) which
nearly triple each.
Conversely, in the Low Energy Demand (LED) scenario
[15] in which above discussed disruptive social and tech-
nological innovations unfold progressively, illustrating
a pathway to SDG12 (Sustainable Development Goal 12,
responsible consumption and production) global materi-
als use stabilizes, even declines slightly by 2050 to some
83Gt. Growth is very uneven in such a scenario rang-
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ing from expansion (biomass +33%), stabilization/slight
decline (non-metallic minerals –6%) to drastic reductions
(minerals –70%) and phase out (fossil fuels –90%).
The two contrasting scenarios bracket the market devel-
opment uncertainties for thematerials (extraction, process-
ing) and manufacturing sectors for the coming decades.
Material categories essential for providing for basic goods
and services are less affected by potential impacts of dis-
ruptive innovations associated with digitalization (biomass
for food, non-metal minerals for shelter and infrastructure)
and have quite stable prospects and robust patterns across
bifurcating scenarios. Conversely, minerals and above all
fossil fuels face a crossroads between boom and bust, de-
pending onwhether current technological and social trends
continue to prevail, or change radically under the twin influ-
ences of disruptive innovations and digitalization, as well
as climate policy.
Above presented scenarios should not be interpreted as
forecasts or projections. Scenarios are simply illustrations
of structured “what if, then” thought experiments, quan-
tified with the help of formal models with the purpose to
serve strategic planning for industry and governments. But
they illustrate that times indeed seem changing and the fu-
ture for the materials sector seems to be much wider open
now than it was in the past.
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